Cameron at 10 Page 17

  5 May 2011 also sees the local elections. The Conservatives gain eighty-six councillors while the Lib Dems lose a ‘catastrophic’ 748, compounding their misery.31 For a party in power to have done so well, and from a strong base in the previous local elections, augurs well and strengthens Cameron. The most dramatic result of election day, however, is not the AV referendum. Nor is it the local elections. It is the result north of the border. In Scotland, Alex Salmond’s Scottish National Party gain twenty-three seats, allowing it to form a majority government in the Scottish Parliament for the first time. It will precipitate one of the most historic and perilous episodes of Cameron’s increasingly dramatic premiership.

  ELEVEN

  Scottish Referendum Call

  May 2011–February 2012

  ‘This party, the Scottish party, the national party, carries your hope … I’ll govern for all the ambitions of Scotland and for all the people who can imagine that we can live in a better land.’ These heady words from Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), are uttered in the early hours of Friday 6 May 2011. Scotland had been voting for its own Parliament at Holyrood since 1999. The system had been carefully devised using proportional representation precisely to prevent any one party gaining an overall majority and thus too much power. But achieving an overall majority is exactly what the SNP have now achieved. They are as shocked as anyone: ‘Not in their wildest dreams did they imagine they would get a majority,’ says a senior Lib Dem. Of 129 seats contested, the SNP win sixty-nine, allowing them to form a majority government for the first time. Labour wins thirty-seven seats (losing seven), the Conservatives fifteen (losing five), and the Lib Dems five seats (losing twelve).

  Salmond is determined that Scotland will be independent, and that he will become Scotland’s first ever prime minister. He wants to reclaim the independence lost 304 years before with the Acts of Union in 1707, when the Scottish Parliament voted itself out of existence, accepting political union with England and parliamentary representation in London.1 He is demanding a referendum to settle the question. Scotland will, he believes, be the first part of the United Kingdom to break away and become independent since the Irish Free State in 1922, which later became a republic in 1937. Cameron has not been anticipating this result, though the last phase of the election suggested that it was a possibility. Victory for the SNP sets in motion a train of events that leads Cameron to take what Llewellyn, as ever at the very heart of the Cameron operation, describes as ‘the historic decision of the entire premiership’.2

  The outcome that day in Scotland may have been unexpected, but the prospect of a referendum to deal with the ‘Scottish Question’ had been considered before by Cameron and Osborne. They had often pondered the problematic Conservative representation in Northern Ireland and Scotland. In Scotland there had been a steady Conservative decline since the Second World War: MPs have dwindled from thirty-six in 1955, to twenty-two in 1979, to zero in 1997, and they have picked up just one seat since, in 2005. However, Cameron and Osborne were very confident that Scotland would vote to remain in the UK, and became attracted to the idea of initiating a referendum on Scotland’s continuation in the United Kingdom. To Osborne, the key was the middle class in the central Edinburgh–Glasgow belt of Scotland supporting the Union.3 Holding and winning a referendum would seize the initiative north of the border, and put a lid on the nationalist clamour. The proposal foundered because of the implacable opposition to the plan by Brown. To have promoted the idea in the teeth of opposition by the Labour prime minister would have alienated supporters north of the border. So they dropped the plan, but their cogitations gave them an appetite for radical thinking.

  On 14 May 2010, a week after the general election and on only his third full day in office, Cameron visits Scotland for the first time as prime minister to address the Scottish Parliament and to meet Salmond. The new PM is no stranger to Scotland: he is the possessor of a Scottish name with roots in the Western Highlands and has family links through Samantha’s stepfather to the Isle of Jura.4 He is fired by Big Society zeal for localism and spreading power away from London, a zeal that is only enhanced by the coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Cameron tells the Holyrood Parliament that day he wants an ‘agenda of respect’ between both Parliaments.5 Accompanied by his initial Scotland Secretary, Danny Alexander, they give Salmond the distinct impression they want to go further than the existing Scotland Act and are supportive of moves towards further devolution. Salmond is pleased. He says that the meeting is ‘more substantive’ than he had expected.6

  Scottish devolution disappears from the limelight over the following six months. Other priorities preoccupy both leaders. Osborne remains in the vanguard of those who believe a referendum may be necessary. He sees the issue in strongly political terms, whereas Cameron sees it much more in national terms. Alexander, who has become a close colleague of Osborne’s since his promotion to Chief Secretary to the Treasury at the end of May, thinks similarly.7 Both are ahead of their party leaders. Cameron is sincere about the ‘respect agenda’ and wants to take the Scottish concerns seriously. The question he keeps asking is ‘what is the right thing to do for democracy?’ Then the surprise SNP victory in May 2011, which provides a mandate for the party’s commitment to hold a referendum, changes everything. At a meeting of the Quad in June, Osborne, who wants a quick referendum to kill off independence, says it must be dominated from London, and imposed on Edinburgh. ‘Why don’t we just do what the Spanish do and say (to their own separatists) we hold the power!’ The Lib Dems respond that they cannot impose a referendum settlement unilaterally on Salmond.

  In Edinburgh, Salmond has begun poring over the options for greater devolution and full independence. At a meeting at his official residence, Bute House on Charlotte Square, he decides to run with ‘Devo Max’, which would greatly enhance the powers of the Scottish Parliament, but stops short of severing the link to Westminster and the Crown. It may not be the holy grail of full independence but Salmond and his advisers recognise that a vote for Devo Max will be more likely to achieve a majority in a referendum than one for the full monty, which will scare off some voters with vestigial attachment for remaining in the UK. But the idea runs into trouble, in part because the Lib Dems, who are the most enthusiastic of the three main parties in Westminster for devolution, are not supportive.

  The Christmas holiday in 2011 sees the pace quicken dramatically. In the run-up to it, Cameron receives a visit at Number 10 from the Conservative Party’s Scottish grandees – Lord Strathclyde, Leader of the Lords, and two former Scotland Secretaries, Lord Lang and Lord Forsyth. The last advises: ‘Hold a referendum within the next three months, and don’t yield on the question, the timing or franchise.’ ‘Once we concede a referendum,’ Cameron replies, ‘how do we stop conceding it again and again?’ Cameron realises that being seen to block such a referendum will be counterproductive. The SNP will hold it on their own, and the knowledge that the Conservatives were trying to prevent it will bring resentment, making a vote for independence in some form more likely. Alexander believes that the argument that ‘Salmond would call a consultative referendum even if we didn’t’ is key to convincing Cameron.8 Now he has begun focusing on the issue again, the PM sees that if he gets out ahead of the SNP, and is seen to be supportive of a referendum, he can ensure that it will be properly organised, that the results will be binding and lawful, and he will have more say and influence.

  Cameron’s team believe that Salmond is posturing and isn’t ready to hold a referendum yet: ‘So we thought, let’s seize the initiative and hold it when he is wrong-footed,’ says one. The argument is moving Osborne’s way. ‘If we don’t lance the boil now it’s going to become a cause célèbre and support for the SNP will magnify. Doing nothing is not an option,’ says another.9 They are convinced that the SNP did so well in the Holyrood elections despite their commitment to independence, not because of it: indeed, they believe Salmond fought shy of making it a major part of
his platform because he knows that many Scottish voters do not want to go that far. Cameron’s team remain privately sure they will win any referendum.

  Cameron spends a lot of time thinking and talking to Osborne over Christmas. Before the New Year, they decide they will take the plunge and instigate a referendum. The Quad holds a core meeting on 3 January 2012. All four principals finally sign up to the referendum: following the wrangling over AV the year before, they are relieved to alight on an electoral issue on which they can agree. Michael Moore, Alexander’s successor as Scotland Secretary, has been summoned to attend: ‘The Tories were totally gung-ho. It was all about “seizing control” of the initiative. It was all pretty macho, testosterone-fuelled stuff and “only by showing them who’s the leader will we get things done”,’ he says.10 Clegg and Alexander have repeatedly stressed it cannot be a referendum seen to be controlled from London, still less by the Conservative Party. Osborne and Cameron agree: the SNP must not be given any pretext for arguing that this is anything other than a totally fair contest. The Quad is clear that there must be a single ‘either/or’ question on the referendum ballot paper.

  On Sunday 8 January, Cameron goes to the BBC for his start-the-year television interview with Andrew Marr. To the surprise of viewers, he announces that the government is to offer Salmond a legally constituted referendum. ‘We owe the Scottish people something that is fair, legal and decisive. And so in the coming days we’ll be setting out clearly what the legal situation is.’ To increase pressure on Salmond, who they are convinced is running scared, he says that it must be held within eighteen months and must only pose one question – ruling out the option of voters being offered the choice of either full independence, Devo Max or the status quo. The coup de théâtre does indeed wrong-foot Salmond. The rest of the Sunday is taken up by briefing and counter-briefing, with the SNP alleging that Westminster is trying to dominate the referendum from London, and are bullying the SNP. The Lib Dems on the Quad are furious at the way Number 10 spin Cameron’s television statement in a much more belligerent way.

  On 9 January, Cabinet convenes to achieve agreement over the government’s strategy on the referendum. They meet, unusually, in the Olympic Park in East London’s Stratford, in the middle of a large sports hall. The PM opens by urging all ministers to exploit the opportunities to showcase the British summer of 2012, with the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee and the Olympic Games. After the meeting he announces they will be joined by London mayor Boris Johnson and chairman of the Olympic organising committee, Sebastian Coe, on a tour of the facilities and organisations associated with the games. Jeremy Heywood is now Cabinet Secretary, having succeeded Gus O’Donnell at the end of December. Scotland is the main item on the agenda. Ministers agree with proposals to give Holyrood legal and constitutional authority to stage the referendum. Not all are convinced. Iain Duncan Smith and Gove doubt whether any interference from London will be acceptable to the SNP. ‘It will just be seen as meddling,’ Gove argues. But they endorse the argument that a fair and legal vote will lead to a decisive result, hopefully ending the call for a referendum for a generation or more.

  On 10 January the focus shifts to the Commons, and Moore lays out the details of the government’s proposal. The Scottish Parliament is not empowered to hold a referendum, he states, but the UK government will change the law to allow it to hold ‘a legal, fair and decisive referendum’ on Scottish independence.11 He announces that there will only be one question, and suggests that the referendum should be staged before the end of 2013, a good year earlier than Salmond wants, in the hope of catching him off guard. He also states his hope that the referendum will be overseen by the Electoral Commission, and the next phase will be a consultation with the people of Scotland on the best way to facilitate such a referendum. ‘Salmond was furious,’ recalls one involved in the negotiations, ‘he hated the fact that we had put ourselves so firmly in the game.’

  The starting gun has been fired. Cameron has indeed taken potentially the most fateful decision of his premiership. Now for the detail, including finalising the question, the timing and the franchise – should the voting age be reduced to include sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds? What exactly will the question be and when will polling day be? Will the campaign be conducted under Westminster or Holyrood’s authority? Number 10 realises it needs to increase its firepower. In February 2012, the Glasgow-born Scot, Andrew Dunlop, who worked in Thatcher’s Number 10 and has since worked in political consultancy, joins the Policy Unit. He rapidly gains the trust of the Lib Dems and becomes a major figure in negotiations. Cabinet itself delegates responsibility for the issue to a Scotland committee, chaired by Osborne and subsequently by the Scotland Secretary. Danny Alexander and Oliver Letwin are the two dominant members.

  Cameron’s thinking is developing rapidly. On 15 February, he is in Scotland to deliver what will be his defining speech of the long referendum campaign. He hosts a dinner at the Peat Inn near St Andrews and discusses progress with his team, including Heywood’s successor at Number 10, now called director general of the prime minister’s office Chris Martin, Craig Oliver and Dunlop. They are joined by Alan Cochrane, editor of the Scottish edition of the Daily Telegraph and an influential figure in Scottish circles. Cameron has been encouraged for some months by journalist and friend Bruce Anderson to listen to Cochrane’s views. Cameron reveals he is prepared to make significant concessions to Salmond in the interests of showing how amenable the British government is being, as long as Salmond accepts his ‘red line’ of a single ‘yes/no’ question.12 He will even concede the referendum date to Salmond, which private polling has suggested will not significantly affect the outcome, and that the SNP can have their way on including sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, which again Conservative polling suggests will make little to no difference to the outcome. But Cameron insists that the referendum should be overseen by the Electoral Commission, another red line for him, which means that they will be the arbiters, not London or Edinburgh, on the precise question to be put to voters. ‘Let Salmond boycott it,’ Cameron tells his team over dinner.13 ‘Cameron had come to a very nuanced understanding,’ says one of his team. ‘He realised it would be self-defeating to impose the question and timetable from Westminster. If the vote was lost by the nationalists, as we expected it would be, they could always come back and say it was unfair. Thus the timing and precise question should be decided by Scotland itself to place the outcome beyond any future dispute.’14 The Liberal Democrats, in the form of Alexander and Moore, are delighted that Cameron has come to this conclusion.

  On the morning of 16 February, Cameron drives south to give his speech at the Apex Hotel in Edinburgh, a dramatic view of the castle behind him.15 The text has been long debated in Number 10. Julian Glover had been brought in as chief speechwriter the previous October from the Guardian: it is he who holds the pen, describing it ‘as one of the most romantic of the speeches that Cameron gave as prime minister’.16 Gove is responsible for much of the content including that Scotland and the rest of the UK are ‘better together’, and that Scotland is a great success story, shares much in common throughout history with the rest of the UK, and that both countries should thus remain together. Scare tactics are totally off the page. Gove’s input can be detected in the reference to Aberdeen, his home town, early in the speech: ‘In Aberdeen, King’s and Marischal Colleges remind us of a time when the Granite City had as many universities for its citizens as England had for all of hers.’17 The message of Cameron’s speech is summed up neatly by one of the team: ‘You Scots are my mates, we love you, you are brilliant.’ Cameron knows how much is at stake, and has spent much time on the drafts:

  I am convinced that both for Scotland and for the United Kingdom, our best days lie ahead of us … I know that the Conservative Party is not currently – how can I put this – Scotland’s most influential political movement. I am often reminded that I have been more successful in helping to get pandas into the zoo than Conservative MPs elected in
Scotland … I am here to stand up and speak out for what I believe in. I believe in the United Kingdom. I am a unionist head, heart and soul. I believe that England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, we are stronger together than we ever would be apart. When you set aside difference, when you roll up your sleeves in a common endeavour, you achieve things that are truly worthwhile – even noble – which you could never accomplish on your own.18

  The speech’s tone surprises many: they had expected a more abrasive tone. ‘It played well,’ thinks one Cabinet member, ‘it was a useful intervention.’

  On 25 May, ‘Yes Scotland’, the pro-independence campaign, is launched with a media razzmatazz at a multiplex cinema in central Edinburgh. A month later, on 25 June, ‘Better Together’ launches, at the Craiglockhart campus of Edinburgh Napier University, with Alistair Darling, the leader of the campaign, centre stage. The leadership was debated at length by the Quad. Clegg’s two predecessors as leader of the Lib Dems, Charles Kennedy and Menzies Campbell, are considered, but judged insufficiently to mobilise Labour. John Reid in contrast is looked at very keenly, but rules himself out. It is abundantly clear that Better Together must be led by a Scot, and that it had to be someone from Labour: a Tory, especially if posh, would have been fatal. Gordon Brown is judged to be too egotistical and unreliable to head it up. Darling, in contrast, with the gravitas of a former chancellor, is liked and respected by Osborne and Cameron as well as by the Lib Dems. That same month, at a reception at Dover House in London, Cameron surprises some of his side when he openly appears to concede the timing to the SNP. ‘Frankly the timing matters but I’m pretty relaxed about it,’ he tells the assembled Scotland Office officials and press. ‘I think I exceeded my brief a bit there,’ he confesses to Moore on the way out. ‘But it does us no harm to give this a bit more momentum.’ The Scotland Secretary is nonplussed. As one Lib Dem later said, ‘Maybe he felt he had to give something to the press. He is immensely tactical.’ Concern spreads about strategic drift.